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KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF THE ADOPTED
CHILD IN KENTUCKY
I. INTRODUCrION
Adoption was not known in this country until the middle of the
nineteenth century.' No foundation had been laid for it in English
common law;2 it is completely statutory in origin. As a result one must,
when discussing the scope and effect of adoption on inheritance rights,
always look to the statutory scheme in the particular jurisdiction.3
This Note examines the problems of the adopted child vis-a-vis testate
and intestate succession in Kentucky. The subject has been divided
into three rather broad categories: (1) the persons from whom the
adopted child can take under the laws of descent and distribution, (2)
the conflict of laws problems, and (3) the construction of language
in wills and trust instruments.
II. FRo WHOM THE ADOPTED CTrn CAN TAKE
UNDER THE LAWS OF DESCENT AND DisTmunoN
Perhaps the most compelling problem in this area concerns the
adopted child's right to inherit from its natural parents. Kentucky
accords this issue special treatment. Kentucky Revised Statute 199.-
630(2) [hereinafter referred to as KRS] reads:
Where parental rights have been terminated pursuant to KRS 199.600
to 199.620, all legal relationships between the parents and child shall cease
to exist, the same as if the relationship of parent and child had never
existed, except that the child shall retain the right to inherit from its
parents under the laws of descent and distribution.
This statute was enacted in 1950. KRS 199.520(2), as amended in
1956, reads in part: "From and after the date [of adoption] . . .the
child ... shall have no legal relationship to its birth parents in respect
to either personal or property rights." The obvious inconsistency of
these two provisions was pointed out in Kentucky Trust Co. v.
Sweeney,4 where a federal court reached the necessary conclusion that
the 1956 amendment to KRS 199.520 nullified that part of KRS
199.620 with which it was inconsistent.
The clarity of KRS 199.520(2) enabled the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals, in a recent decision, to conclude that a child adopted by his
1 Halback, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class Gifts, 50 IowA L.
REv. 971 (1965).2 POLLOCK & MArrLAND, THE HSORY OF ENGLISH LA-W 399 (2d ed. 1898).
a The Adoption Provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes are contained in
Chapter 199.
4 163 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Ky. 1958).
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stepfather could not inherit from his natural father's uncle.5 In that
case, the Court reasoned that "the present adoption law envisions a
'complete breaking off of old ties."' 6 In a similar vein, the Sweeney
case held that Kentucky law does not entitle a testator's niece to
share in an estate left to "my heirs under Kentucky descent and dis-
tribution laws." Because the niece had been adopted by persons not
related to the testator, the court said: "Under this statute [KRS
199.520] she [the adopted child] had no legal relationship to her birth
parents ... "7
With the complete reversal in the adoption law brought about by
the amendment,8 Kentucky has joined the majority of states which
forbid an adopted child's inheriting from or through his natural
parents.0 Granted that it is a matter of legislative policy, the majority
seems to represent the less equitable rule. It is the natural parents (or
a court, in some instances) who make the choice to sever the ties; why
should the child be penalized for something over which he had no
control and to which he gave no consent? 10
Especially is this rule unfair where the child was not adopted
until after the death of the natural parents. Here the only issue is the
child's taking through the natural parents. His right to inherit from
them vests in him at the parents' deaths and is not affected by a sub-
sequent adoption. In that case there is no express choice to sever the
ties between the child and his parents. Adoption in such a case is
solely for the purpose of giving the child a new family, whereas
adoption when the natural parents are living is partly for the reason
of taking him away from his old family. As yet the Court has not
decided this question. None of the cases decided after the 1956
amendment mention whether the natural parents were dead or alive
at the time of the adoption. If this question comes before the Court,
it is suggested that it take the more reasonable view.
5 Arciero v. Hager, 397 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1965).
6 Id. at 53.
7 163 F. Supp. at 452.8 Prior to the 1956 amendment the statute read in part: "Nothing in this
section shall prevent an adoptive child from inheriting from its natural parents."
KRS § 199.530(5) (1950).
9 Twenty-three jurisdictions prohibit the adopted child from inheriting from
his natural parents, twelve states grant the right, and seventeen do not regulate
this aspect of the law. Nine states recognize the adopted child's right to inherit
mrough the natural parents, twenty-five deny it and seventeen have no regulation.
Benavince. Adoption and the Law of Descent and Distribution: A Comparative
Studu and a Proposal for Model Legislation, 51 CORmLL L.Q. 152, 164 n.47
(1966).
10See Sorenson v. Churchill. 51 S.D. 113, 212 N.W. 488 (1927) and In re
Benner's Estate, 109 Utah 172, 166 P.2d 2.57 (1946) for an argument for allowing
inheritance by the adopted child on this ground.
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When a child is adopted, he is, by virtue of KRS 199.520, con-
sidered to be the natural, legitimate child of the adoptive parents, at
least for purposes of inheritance and succession. From the language
of that provision the adopted child clearly inherits from the adoptive
parents;" but does he inherit through them? In 1946, the Kentucky
Court, construing the then-existing law, said that the adopted child
had the right to "inherit not only from but through the adopting
parent."12 The statute then in effect read in part: "Any child adopted
according to this chapter shall be considered for purposes of inheri-
tance and succession and for all other legal consequences the natural
legitimate child of the parents adopting it."13 This language is almost
identical to the first part of KRS 199.520(2) as it reads today; thus
there is no question, under Kentucky law, of the ability of the adopted
child to take through, as well as from, its adoptive parents.
Another troublesome area concerns the rights of others to take
from and through the adopted child. There are two important ques-
tions here: first, whether the children inherit from and through each
other if parents adopt more than one child; second, whether the
adoptive or natural parents, or neither, inherit from the adopted child
who dies without issue. There are no Kentucky cases on the former
question, so we can only look to the statute. It explicitly states that
the adopted child is for all legal considerations "the natural, legitimate
child of the parents adopting it the same as if born of their bodies."14
If all adopted children are treated as natural, legitimate children of the
parents, it follows that they are, for purposes of inheritance and suc-
cession, natural brothers and/or sisters; thus the Court could not but
conclude that they would inherit from each other. The second question
also must be solved by looking to the statute, for again there are no
cases in point. The logical conclusion is that the adoptive parents take
to the exclusion of the natural parents. This is, in fact, the majority
view of the jurisdictions which deny the right to inherit from and
through the natural parents,15 and also the view which is the more
equitable. After all, the natural parents brought about the severance of
11 "Even a casual reading of this Act in its original form will convince one
that the legislative intent in the passage of the Act was to place a minor when
adopted on the same basis as a child born into the family." Stanfield v. Willough-
by, 286 S.W.2d 908. 909 (Ky. 1956).12 Kolb v. Ruhl's Adm'r, 303 Ky. 604, 612, 198 S.W.2d 326, 329 (1946).
1a KRS § 405.200 (1940).
14KRS § 199.520(2) (1956).
15 "[T]he general trend is to construe the modern adoption statutes as con-
ferring upon the adoptive parents of an adopted child the right to inherit the
estate of the child to the exclusion of the child's natural parents where the
statutory language is reasonably open to such a construction." 2 Amf. JuR. 2d
Adoption § 101 (1962).
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ties, and the adoptive parents assumed all the obligations incident to
raising legitimate children. Thus, the latter should succeed to the
child's estate if any "parents" are to do so.
If, however, the adoptive parents predecease the adopted child, do
the natural parents then inherit from him? Prior to 1950, the answer
would have been a definite "yes," for then in effect was KRS 891.-
080(2), which read in part:
If the adoptive parents of the adopted child do not survive the adopted
child, the property of the deceased adopted child, in the absence of law-
ful issue, shall go to the natural parents in the line of descent and as
provided by KRS 391.010 and 391.030.
This statute was repealed in 1950, and presently it is an open question
whether the Kentucky Court would allow the natural parents to take
from the adopted child. Considering that before 1950 the adopted
child could inherit from the natural parents and that now he cannot,
considering the presumption which accompanies the repeal of any
statute, and considering the strong language the Court has used in
finding the child unable to inherit from the natural parents,16 one
can easily conclude that the natural parents would under no circum-
stances take from the adopted child. This is the better view and one
the Court should adopt when presented with the issue.
Another related question concerns the status of the child who has
been adopted twice. Under our statute it seems clear that the child
would have inheritance and succession rights from and through the
second adoptive parents, but what of the child's relationship with the
prior adoptive parents? If the adoption proceeding has the effect of
"excising the adopted child from its 'blood' family tree,"' 7 causing him
to be considered for all purposes the natural, legitimate child of the
adoptive parents after the first adoption, then it would seem to
follow that upon the second adoption the adopted child loses all legal
relationship with the first adoptive parents.'8
Would the fact that the first adoptive parents were dead at the
time of the second adoption alter the rights of the child to inherit
16 In Arciero v. Hager, 397 S.W.2d 50. 52-53 (Ky. 1965), the Court sneaks
of the adoption as "excising the adopted child from its 'blood family tree" and"[bringing] . . . to an end all connections, legal and personal, with any natural
parent."
17 Arciero v. Hager, supra note 16, at 52.
1 There are no Kentucky decisions subsequent to the 1956 amendment in-
volving tlds issue, but of interest may be decisions of jurisdictions which, like Ken-
tucky, deny the adonted child the right to inherit from or through its natural
parents. In re Zaepfel's Estate, 102 Cal. App. 2d 774. 228 P.2d 600 (1951) held
that, under California law, a twice-adopted child could not succeed to the estate of
the former foster parent. To the same effect is Killen v. Klebanoff, 17 Conn.
Supp. 233 (Surer. Ct. 1951).
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through his prior adoptive parents? Some believe this would make a
difference,'" but it is not clear what effect this would have in Ken-
tucky. If whether the natural parents are dead or alive at the time of
a first adoption makes no difference in the rights of the adopted child
to take through them,2 0 then it follows that it would make no difference
where the twice-adopted child and the prior adoptive parents are con-
cerned. It is submitted, for the same reasons suggested above in the
discussion of adoptions which take place after the death of the
natural parents,2 ' that if the adoption takes place after the death of
the prior adoptive parents, the child would not lose his right to in-
herit through them.
The last problem to be discussed in this area is dual inheritance.
There seems to be a feeling that one simply should not be entitled to a
double share of an estate.2 2 This problem arises when an adopted child
is entitled to share in the same estate through both his natural and
adoptive parents. Since in Kentucky an adopted child cannot take
through his natural parents, the adopted child is never placed in that
situation. However, it is interesting to note that if the Court decides,
as it should, that the adopted child can take through the natural
parents or prior adoptive parents when the adoption takes place after
their deaths, Kentucky would be confronted with the problem of
dual inheritance. The simple solution would be to allow the double
heir to take only one share of the estate, but to permit him to choose
which share he will take.23
III. CoNxaar OF LAws ThoBLEms
Perhaps the greatest practical problem in this area deals with the
choice of law in litigation involving the adoptee's right to inherit. The
problem is really two-fold: (1) what jurisdictional law is to apply
and, (2) in the case of prior statutes, which controls? A 1965 Ken-
tucky case, Arciero v. Hager,24 dealt with both aspects of the problem.
In that case the appellant had been adopted in New York in 1946 by
his stepfather, and his natural father's uncle died intestate in Ken-
tucky in 1959. The Court decided that Kentucky law governed be-
cause "the rights of inheritance of the adopted child are generally
19 Note, 25 BROOKLYN L. REa. 231, 261 (1959).
20 See text at notes 10-11 supra.
21 Ibid.
22 Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 333 (1954).
23 See Billings v. Head, 184 Ind. 361, 111 N.E. 177 (1916); Head v. Leak.
61 Ind. App. 253, 111 N.E. 952 (1916); Morgan v. Reel, 213 Pa. 81, 62 AUt. 2,53
(1905).
24 397 S.W.2d 50.
[Vol. 55,
Noms
governed by the law of the state in which the property is situated if
real property, or the domicile of the decedent if personal."25 This is the
majority view on the question.26 Thus it is well settled in Kentucky
that the applicable law in adoption cases is the law of the situs, or the
law of the decedent's domicle, depending upon whether the property
is real or personal.
The second aspect of the conflict problem deals with temporal
conflicts, i.e., whether a prior or a present statute is controlling. In the
Arciero case, the Court held that the law at the time of the death of
the uncle governed. This affirmed the decision in Kolb v. Ruhis Adm'r,
where the Court stated:
The heirs and distributees of a person dying intestate are determined by
the laws of succession as it eists at the time of death of the owner of
the property. We know of no reason why this rule should not apply
where the rights of adopted children are involved. According to the great
weight of authority the statute of descent and distribution in effect at the
time of the death of the property owner governs the right of the adopted
child.27
The same rule applies in the case of testate succession. When a
testator makes a devise or bequest to a class which will be ascertain-
able only in the future, he is presumed to have contemplated that the
laws might change, and unless a contrary expression is made on the
face of the instrument, the statute in effect when the gift becomes
operative controls.2
8
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF LANGUAGE iN WILLs AND TRUST INSTRUMENTS
The adopted child's right to participate in class gifts under wills
and trust instruments is another large problem area. It has been sug-
gested that there is more litigation over the adopted child's participa-
tion in class gifts than any other problem concerning inheritance rights
of adopted children.29 The real question which concerns the lawyer is
what language is effective to either include adopted children or to
avoid the effects of the adoption statutes. A typical will or trust agree-
ment provides, "to X for life, remainder to X's ." The more
commonly used words of purchase are "children," "heirs," "heirs-at-
law," "issue," or "legal issue." It is axiomatic that the testator's or
settlor's intent should be the determining factor in deciding whether
25 id. at 52.
26 2 Am. Jun. 2d Adoption § 12 (1965); REsTATEmENT, CoNFLIrC OF LAWS
§ 305, comment b (1959).
27 303 Ky. 604, 608, 198 S.W.2d 326, 328 (1946).
2 3 Major v. Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1953).
29 Halbach, note 1 supra.
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the adopted child is a member of the class.30 The problem is, however,
that usually the testator had no intention regarding the adopted child.
Thus the "intention" may be what the law will attribute to the testator.
All such language as the above has been held by the Kentucky Court
to include adopted children.31 Absent any language to the contrary,
the Court assumes the testator meant to include adopted children.
32
This presumption is in keeping with the legislative policy of equal
treatment of adoptive and natural children.
However, two recent cases which concerned those who may take
under a class gift to "children" were Wilson v. Johnson 3 and Penning-
ton v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co.34 In the first case, Leslie John-
son's mother died, leaving a life estate to him and "the remainder to
the children of Leslie." Twenty-five years later he adpoted his two
stepsons, who were forty-eight and fifty-two. In the second case a
seventy-one year old woman adopted her seventy-four year old hus-
band in order to have the remainder of her life estate go to him as her
"child." The Johnson case held that the adopted adults were not in-
cluded in the class of "children," overruling that portion of Edmands
v. Tice35 which was inconsistent. The Pennington case held likewise.
The Court based these decisions on the assumption that a testator in
specifying "children" does not intend to include adopted adults unless
he specifically so states. The testator, in the common usage of the
word, is thinking in terms of not just a legal, but also a social, relation-
ship; thus the adopted adult is not included. In examining a similar
case, Bedinger v. Graybils Ex'r and Trustee,36 one can see that it is
not the bizarreness of the adoption that defeats the inheritance rights
of the adopted adult, but rather the words chosen by the testator. In
that case Mrs. Graybill established a testamentary trust for her son for
life, remainder to his "heir-at-law under Kentucky law." The testatrix
died in 1923, and in 1941, when the son was fifty-eight, he adopted his
forty-five year old wife. The son died in 1955 and the Court held that
the wife was entitled to the estate as the son's "heir-at-law." The Court
thought that the purpose of making the adoptee eligible to inherit the
property was a legitimate aim of adoption and that the scheme works
30 Major v. Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1953).
3
1 Breckinridge v. Skillman's Trustee, 330 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1959) ("son's
issue"); Edmands v. Tice, 324 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1958) ("children"); Bedinger
v. Graybfll's Ex'r & Trustee, 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957) ("heir"); Major v.
Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1953) ("heir-at-law"); Issacs v. Manning, 312
Ky. 326, 227 S.W.2d 418 (1950) ("legal heirs").32 1ssacs v. Manning, 312 Ky. 326, 227 S.W.2d 418 (1950).
33389 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1965).
34390 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1965).
35324 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1958).
36302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
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NOTES
to make the wife beneficiary, where otherwise she would not be, does
not make the adoption invalid. Note that the reasoning in Johnson is
not applicable when the class is "heirs," "legal heirs," "heirs-at-law," or
"issue." Thus, the presumption of inclusion is still in effect, except in
the case of the adopted adult and a gift to the "children of X."
To exclude adopted children from taking part of an estate, the
testator must make known this intention in the will. With the exception
of "children" when the adoptee is an adult, any broad category such
as "heirs," "heirs-at-law," or "children" will not exclude adopted
children. A good exposition of the law is found in a recent case:
As we understand the rule an adopted child is not to be excluded from
taldng under a will merely because the testator had never considered
the possibility of an adoption taking place. The language of the will
must be such as to show a specific intention to exclude an adopted child.
Ordinarily this would require use of such language as "natural children"
or some clearly exclusive expression.
37
Perhaps the best solution, if the testator wants to keep property in the
blood line, would be for him to use "to the exclusion of adopted
children" or words of similar import.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent cases the Court has seftled some of the problems con-
cerning the adopted child's right to inherit. In most instances it has
accepted the majority view and the one which is most equitable. In
other instances, notably the question of the child's right to take through
the natural parent, the Court has failed to meet the demands of
justice. Perhaps in the future it will do so. Other questions are not
truly seftled because there have been no cases in point. For the answers
to such questions we will have to wait, but it is hoped that the Court
will find the equitable solutions.
Charles A. Taylor
3 7 Edmands v. Tice, 324 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Ky. 1958).
